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KANTIAN ETHICS FOR THE VERY YOUNG:
Antimoral and Anthropomorphism in I Want My Hat Back
By Anita Fairbanks

It was past her bedtime. My husband and I heard the fridge slam shut and our three-yearold daughter scuffle upstairs, down the hall to her bedroom. “Charlotte?” my husband called. She
opened our door a crack. “What were you doing downstairs?”
“Nothing,” she said, beaming like the morning sun. “I don’t have pie in my bed.”
Discipline requires a somber disposition, which can be difficult for a parent who finds an
entire pie hidden under a pillow. My response to Jon Klassen’s I Want My Hat Back, where an
adorable bear gobbles up an adorable rabbit out of revenge and then gets away with it, included
shock, maniacal laughter, and the urgent need to share the book with someone as cynical as
myself. This was an anti-fable—it mocked the idea of a moral. In it, Klassen’s bear circumvents
the conventional justice owed to fallen heroes and plot criminals alike; moreover, through the
employment of an anti-moral, craftily cloaked in repetition, anthropomorphism, and irony, he
emancipates the ethical from the moral, in fact clarifying for his readers the choice between right
and wrong.
I Want My Hat Back begins with a bear who wants his hat back. Because of his
impeccable manners, and because he helps a turtle onto a rock, we identify the bear as “the good
guy.” The plot thickens when the bear meets a rabbit wearing a bright red conical hat. In line
with his minimalist style, Klassen color-codes the text. The rabbit’s font is red, like the hat,
whereas every other animal’s font matches their physical appearance: green for the frog, rust for
the fox, etc. It’s as if, upon telling a lie about the red hat, the rabbit has become the lie.
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“Have you seen my hat?” the bear asks. “No,” says the rabbit. “I would not steal a hat”
(Klassen 8). The rabbit lies. Later, the bear confronts the hat-wearing rabbit. The following page
features the bear wearing the hat, with no rabbit in sight. The bear is delightfully simplistic here:
“I love my hat” (Klassen 28).
Did the bear really eat the rabbit? I interviewed my children for some rhetorical response.
Gabriel, age 7, said, “he sat on the rabbit. Maybe he scared him away.” Atticus, age 10, found
the inference easy: “he ate the rabbit.” Charlotte, age 12, responded cautiously, “the rabbit was
there, and now he’s not.”
Does the bear feel no remorse? Through statements of denial, we confirm our suspicions
when a squirrel comes by looking for the rabbit. “Excuse me,” he says, “have you seen a rabbit
wearing a hat?” The bear lies: “No... I would not eat a rabbit” (Klassen 30). We infer through the
repetition that the bear has devoured the rabbit. He has gone from victim to culprit, but no
consequence falls from heaven.
The protagonists in most picture books, especially Aesopic fables with proverbial morals,
follow more predictable character arcs. For example, we may see the “bad guy does the wrong
thing and is punished” storyline, as in Aesop’s “The Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing,” or the “good
guy does the wrong thing and is punished” storyline, as in Beatrix Potter’s Peter Rabbit or in
Mary Howitt’s The Spider and the Fly. We may find the softer “good guy does the wrong thing
and is punished but then forgiven” plot, like in David Shannon’s No, David!, or, the “bad guy
does the right thing and is rewarded” one, like in Oscar Wilde’s The Selfish Giant. Finally, the
token favorite for superheroes, epic champions, pure maidens, and satisfying resolutions, is the
“good guy does the right thing and is rewarded” plot, like in Dr. Seuss’s Horton Hatches the
Egg. All these storylines have something in common; namely, good deeds are rewarded and bad
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ones punished. What we don’t often find is “good guy does the wrong thing, but is not
punished”—the category to which Klassen’s book belongs. There, the moral of the story is
conspicuously absent—the bear is contentedly loving his hat, and we wonder, “so, is dishonesty
okay?”
But we like our new hat. In her essay, “Innocence lost: picturebook narratives of
depravity,” Katarzyyna Smyczynska warns us about the ending:
“[I Want My Hat Back] uncritically sanctions violence inflicted on others
in revenge. Klassen may have been inspired by the convention of animal fables or
cautionary tales, but his work does not resemble either of these in one important
aspect: the presence of the moral behind the story. In this book, there is no hope
or way out of the moral swamp, where amorality is contagious” (66).
Is Klassen tricking us into trying the amoral hat on, and letting the depraved state of modern
culture do the rest? Smyczynska also purports that the book “creates an overwhelming vision of
the triumph and impunity of the powerful” (61).
But animals eat one another all the time, don’t they? According to Gabriel, “the bear ate
the rabbit because that’s what they do.” Charlotte points out that the law of food chains might
make this right: “if a hamburger stole my hat,” she explains, “I would eat the hamburger.” So
perhaps Klassen draws an imaginary line between nature and civilization? But if things are up
for grabs in the wild, then why does the bear own a hat?
That would be a convenient argument out of Smyczynska’s alleged moral swamp, but
Klassen’s use of anthropomorphism implies human rules; for example, he employs details such
as talking beasts, ownership of clothing, public spaces, revenge, polite social expressions, and
the conspicuous fact there is only one word, namely “rabbit,” that identifies any of the characters
as animals in the first place. Klassen isn’t hiding his message; this is no hat trick.
Have we arrived at a barren wasteland devoid of all that is good? I agree with
Smyczynska that the moral is not present, and yet I disagree that the result is amorality. Using an
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antimoral, Klassen is helping us see ethical choices more clearly without morality there to
complicate things. This new view reflects the individualism of the world, just as the bear makes
the choice to eat the rabbit. Why bother with portraying justice when that is no longer the way
we see the world operate? Even 10-year-old Atticus has noticed that “sometimes you see
someone lie and it works out well for them.”
So--we may be in the moral swamp, but Klassen doesn’t abandon us there; he uses deadpan humor to point the way to Kantian ethics. He uses dramatic irony when the bear fails to
grasp that the rabbit has seen the hat, verbal irony within the lies, and situational irony when the
reader mistakenly expects the outcome of justice at the end. We laugh, and then know we do not
want to be the fool in the fable. The illustrations reflect this intentionality by depicting the hat as
a conical one. It is a dunce cap. Thus, in a reductio ad absurdum, we are moved to the ethical to
avoid the ridiculous.
Klassen emancipates the ethical from the moral by dispensing with punishment. In life, if
not literature, the penal system is messy. My children tried hard to defend the bear in their poststorytime interview:
Charlotte: “The rabbit should be punished.”
Gabriel: “I would steal that hat back. The bear is a good guy because he ate a bad
rabbit.”
Anita: “What if he had eaten a good rabbit?”
Atticus: “See, as long as your crime is equivalent to their crime, it’s okay.”
Anita: “So it’s okay to murder someone if they murder you?”
Luckily, it is not the rabbit’s corrupting lesson we take with us, but our own surprise.
Within the unexpectedness of the ending, Klassen invokes Immanuel Kant’s categorical
imperative, which is, in brief: “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law” (30). Klassen shows us the disintegration of
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society should we choose to lie, thereby providing external, amoral motivation to tell the truth.
Klassen’s bear prepares us for a world in which ethics can exist without a moral to the story.
Am I brave enough to dare imitate this? I’m still hiding pies in my bed, and I have too
much to learn about the rules before I start breaking them and gobbling up rabbits; however, I
deeply respect the courage of Klassen’s work, its elegant simplicity, and the way he surprises us,
brave and unencumbered.
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